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Abstract. In this paper we analyze the implementation of socially optimal merg-
ers when the regulator is not informed about all parameters that determine social
and private gains from potential mergers. We show that implementation requires a
certain degree of agreement between social and private incentives. The most im-
portant example where this congruence is present is when the uncertainty refers to
cost savings, because in this case society and firms want costs savings to be as high
as possible. Then, it is possible to induce firms to truthfully reveal the costs savings
induced by the merger.
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1 Introduction
Suppose two firms decide to merge. The effects of this merger on social welfare
are twofold. On the one hand, the degree of competition falls and this affects social
welfare negatively. On the other hand, there might be cost reductions (fixed costs,
synergy gains, etc.) or technological improvements that enhance social welfare. The
effect that finally dominates depends entirely on the specification of the problem at
hand.1 It is clear that individual incentives to merge may lead to the wrong decision
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from the point of view of social welfare. That is why, in most western countries,
certain mergers have to be submitted for approval by an independent body.
In USA, Merger Guidelines (MG) were jointly issued by the Department of
Justice and the Federal Trade Commission (1992, 1997). The MG set “general
standards for horizontal mergers” that “affect the degree to which a merger raises
competitive concern” (MG, Sect. 1.51). These standards are based on the values
of Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index both ex ante and ex post (MG, Sect. 1.5). The
Department of Justice has, sometimes, used a more sophisticated technique that
requires estimation of the demand curve (Shapiro 1995; Werden 1996). But even
if a merger raises competitive concerns, it could be authorized if it increases the
productive efficiency of the firms involved (MG Sect. 4). However, MG explicitly
recognize the asymmetry of information concerning efficiency gains between firms
and agencies in charge of applying these guidelines: ”Efficiencies are difficult to
verify and quantify, in part because much of the information relating to efficiencies
is uniquely in the possession of the merging firms” (MG, Sect. 4).
The theory of implementation deals with the design of mechanisms in which
the planner and the agents have different information and objectives and, in order to
achieve social objectives, the planner needs information that is possessed by agents.
But the information supplied by agents can not be trusted because agents may find
it in their interest to submit false information. Thus, the planner is constrained to
achieve allocations that are implementable in the sense that agents must have incen-
tives to provide the information needed to achieve these allocations. The theory of
implementation provides conditions under which social goals can be implemented
or not (an up to date survey is provided by Jackson 2001).
In this paper we apply implementation theory to the problem of finding institu-
tions that control mergers.2 The decision on merger can be regarded as a decision
at the level of a public good, because merger affects all firms in an industry. This,
plus the fact that in our case payoffs (profits) are linear on money suggests that the
findings of implementation theory can be applied straightforwardly to the merger
problem. However, in the standard model of implementation, the set of agents
whose utilities are considered and the set of players who send messages are the
same. This is not the case here, because it is not realistic to assume that consumers
participate in the process, and thus we have to look for mechanisms in which only
firms send messages. This creates a new set up where new techniques and intuitions
are needed. We make a first cut to the problem by focussing on the simplest possible
case: There are two firms and two market structures, no merger and merger. In the
latter Firm 1 buys Firm 2.
Let us summarize the findings of the paper in a nutshell: The possibility of
implementing a merger policy depends entirely on a single condition: This condition
is sufficient and almost necessary for implementation in dominant strategies of a
merger policy if budget balance is not required and sufficient to implement in Nash
equilibrium a merger policy with budget balance. Let P1 be the difference between
monopoly and duopoly profits of Firm 1. Let P2 be duopoly profits of Firm 2.
2 Besanko and Spulber (1993) studied the game played by the antitrust authority and firms in the case
of synergy gains. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) and Levin (1990) provide a rationalization of the procedure
proposed by MG. None of these papers use the framework of implementation.
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Let us plot in a diagram all possible values of P1 and P2 that are a priori possible
from the point of view of the planner. These values reflect changes in the demand
function, or in the possible efficiency gains should the merger take place, etc. Let
M (respectively NM) be the set of points in the plane (P1, P2) for which merger
(resp. no merger) is socially optimal. Then, the condition is the following: It is
possible to draw an increasing function such that all the points in M (resp. NM )
lie above (respectively below) this function.
The intuition of the above result is that implementation requires a certain degree
of congruence between private incentives and social goals. Thus, suppose that the
merger increases social welfare in situation A and lowers it in B. The condition
requires that at least one of the firms gains more with the merger in A than in B.
To illustrate the issue, we present two examples: one in which implementation is
possible and the other where it is not.
Assume that the planner does not know the marginal cost after merger. On the
one hand, we have that social welfare associated to merger is higher the lower the
marginal cost is. On the other hand, the private gains of Firm 1 when the merger
takes place are also decreasing in the postmerger marginal cost. Thus, in this case,
private and social gains move in the same direction and therefore the condition is
satisfied.
Assume that the planner does not know the productive capacity and firms are
identical; The greater the capacity is, the greater the social loss of the merger.
However, in this case, private gains move in the opposite direction: As far as Firm 1
is concerned, if capacities are high, the anticompetitive effect is high and therefore
the positive effect on profits is also high. As far as Firm 2 is concerned, if capacities
are high, profits in duopoly are low and therefore few profits are forgone with the
merger. Thus, private and social gains move in opposite directions and the condition
does not hold.
Summing up, our approach shows that the informational burden on the agency
regulating mergers could be alleviated by the use of implementation theory and that
implementation of the socially optimal merger policy is sometimes possible. We
give several examples of this. However, we are aware that procedures considered
here are too stylized and refer to the simplest case of merger. Our paper simply wants
to indicate a new direction which might be worth looking at. Some extensions of
our model are discussed in the last section.
2 The model
We assume two firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, and two possible market structures –
merger because Firm 1 buys Firm 2 (denoted by a1) and no merger (denoted by
a2). This simplification is justified since it is the simplest possible form of merger.
If in this case the efficient merger policy can not be implemented, there is no hope
that this could be done in more complicated cases. If it can, we may hope to obtain
insights that may be useful to deal with the general case. Let A = {a1, a2}. The
type of firm i, denoted by θi, is a description of all relevant characteristics (costs,
demand, price of inputs, etc.) before and after any possible merger regarding firm i.
Let Θi be the set of all possible characteristics of firm i. Let Θ = X2i=1Θi, be the
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set of characteristics with typical element θ (most of our results do not need the
Condition that Θ has Cartesian product structure). We now spell out two special
instances of our problem that will be used in the sequel.
Rationalization. Firm 1 and Firm 2 have average cost c1 and c2 respectively. It
is known that c1 ≤ c2, but their actual values are unknown. The merger allows to
transfer production from the high cost to the low cost firm.
Synergy gains. Firm 1 and Firm 2 produce with average cost c. If both firms merge,
average cost will be d < c. d and c are unknown to the regulator.
The merger decisions involve transfers of money among firms. Let ti be the
transfer of money to player i. Typically, if firm i is bought during the merger stage,
ti will be positive. We assume that once the merger decision has been taken, the
remaining firms engage in some form of competition (Cournot, Bertrand, etc.). We
represent this in reduced form by writing Πi(a, θ) as the expected payoffs of i as a
function of market structure (a) and characteristics of all firms (θ).3 Notice that in
general the payoff of firm i depends on the characteristics of all firms. In the context
of Bayesian games this situation is called common values. The case in which the
payoff of firm i depends only on the characteristic of i is called private values (see
e.g. Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, pp. 297–298). An example of the latter is when
characteristics of firms are fixed costs provided that they are such that all firms are
always active. If firm i is bought during the merger stage Πi(a, θ) = 0. Thus, the
payoff function of firm i is Πi(a, θ) + ti also written as Vi(a, θ, ti).
We assume that the regulator has no power whatsoever to interfere with the na-
ture of competition, once merger decisions have been taken.4 In this sense we focus
on structure regulation and not on conduct regulation (Vickers 1995). However
the regulator can enforce the rules under which mergers and transfers take place by
means of a mechanism {Mi, g}i=1,2 where Mi is the set of all possible messages
sent by i, with typical element mi. In this paper we disregard consumers as a source
of information, either because they are not informed about costs, technology, etc.,
or because it is too costly to ask each consumer about her own characteristic. In fact
we assume that such characteristics are known by firms (as it is implicitly assumed
by Cournot and Bertrand equilibria). See Examples 3 and 4 below.
Therefore we will consider mechanisms in which only firms send messages.
Let m ∈ M ≡ X2i=1Mi be a list of messages. g = (h(), t1(), t2()) is the outcome
function where h : M −→ A decides mergers as a function of messages and ti:
M −→ R, i = 1, 2 decides the payment received by firm i. We assume that all
payments are controlled by the regulator. If
∑2
i=1 ti(m) ≤ 0 for any m ∈ M the
mechanism is feasible. If, in addition
∑2
i=1 ti(m∗) = 0 when m∗ is an equilibrium
message, the mechanism is budget balanced.
3 If there are several equilibria we assume that each firm has a subjective probability distribution on
the occurrence of different equilibria and so Πi() represents expected profits.
4 In other words, the information gathered from the mechanism can not be used later on to regulate
firms. This may be due to several reasons. For instance in the implementing mechanism presented in
Proposition 2 below, the messages do not permit the complete identification of characteristics. Or, if such
identification is possible, output and profits might be not contractible, an assumption that is plausible
for mergers in certain sectors like banks or airlines.
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If the regulator had complete information, she would like to allow cer-
tain mergers and to forbid others depending on the characteristics of firms. Let
φ : Θ −→ A represent the optimal structure of mergers as a function of the
characteristics of firms. This function is called a Social Choice Rule (SCR). In
what follows we will be mostly concerned with a specific SCR: Let the con-
sumer surplus be written as CS(a, θ). The social welfare, denoted by W , is de-
fined as
∑2
i=1 Πi(a, θ) + CS(a, θ) ≡ W (a, θ). Then, the efficient merger pol-
icy φo is defined as follows; φo(θ) = arg maxa∈A W (a, θ). An extended SCR
φ : Θ −→ A × R2 maps the characteristics of firms into the decision on mergers
and transfers.
A strategy for i is a mapping si : Θ → Mi.
A mechanism {Mi, g}i=1...2 implements the extended SCR φ in dominant
strategies if there are strategies (s1( ), s2( )) = s( ) such that:
a) g(s(θ)) = φ(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. And
b) Vi(g(si(θ),m−i), θ) ≥ Vi(g(mi,m−i), θ) for all (mi,m−i) ∈ M, and θ ∈ Θ.
A mechanism {Mi, g}i=1...2 implements the extended SCR φ in Nash equilib-
rium if there are strategies (s1( ), s2( )) = s( ) such that:
a) g(s(θ)) = φ(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.And
b) Vi(g(si(θ), s−i(θ)), θ) ≥ Vi(g(mi, s−i(θ)), θ) for all mi ∈ Mi and θ ∈ Θ.
3 Dominant strategies
Prima facie, our problem is similar to the problem of implementing an efficient
SCR with quasi-linear utility functions, one public good (the merger decision)
and one private good (transfers). In these economies, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism is such that announcing the true characteristics is a dominant strategy
for each agent, and the decision regarding the public good is efficient (Vickrey 1961;
Clarke 1971; Groves 1973). This mechanism does not achieve budget balance in
general.5 However, there is an important difference between our setting and the
one where the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism works successfully. In our case,
the welfare of consumers enters the social surplus, but they do not send messages.
Thus, new tools are needed.6
It is helpful to define the change in welfare and profits induced by the monop-
olization of the industry. The change in welfare in economy θ is given by:
∆W ≡ W (a1, θ) − W (a2, θ)
5 Moreover, any mechanism attaining efficient decision on the public good must be a Vickrey-
Clarke-Groves mechanism (Green and Laffont 1979). Thus, in general, it is not possible to implement
in dominant strategies any efficient and individually rational SCR. See Groves and Loeb (1975) for a
case where implementation is possible.
6 In Appendix A we show that if consumers knew the state of the economy and participate in the
mechanism, implementation of the eficient merger policy is possible using a generalization of the
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism
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The change in profits of Firm 1 is given by:
P1 ≡ Π1(a1, θ) − Π1(a2, θ)
The relevant information as far as Firm 2 is concerned is its duopoly profits i.e.
what he loses with the merger. They are defined accordingly as:
P2 ≡ Π2(a2, θ)
P2 can be interpreted as the minimum price that induces Firm 2 to sell and of P1
as the maximum price that Firm 1 is prepared to pay for the acquisition of Firm 2.
When needed, ∆W , P1 and P2 will be written as a function of the underlying
characteristic θ as ∆W (θ), P1(θ) and P2(θ).
Let us first concentrate on necessary conditions of implementation by mecha-
nisms in which truth is a dominant strategy. This procedure is validated by the
Revelation Principle. Consider the following condition:
Condition N. Let θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ. Then if ∆W (θ1) > 0 ≥ ∆W (θ2) then:
either P1(θ1) ≥ P1(θ2) or P2(θ2) ≥ P2(θ1).
Condition N states that if a merger is socially optimal in θ, in any θ′ with P1(θ′) >
P1(θ) and P2(θ′) < P2(θ), merger has to be socially optimal. Conversely, if no
merger is socially optimal in θ, in any θ′ with P1(θ′) < P1(θ) and P2(θ′) > P2(θ)
merger can not be socially optimal. In Fig. 1, if at point a merger is socially optimal,
merger must be socially optimal at any point inA. Conversely, if at point b no merger
is socially optimal, no merger must be optimal for any point in B.
Proposition 1. If a SCR is implementable in Dominant Strategies, condition N
holds.
Proof. See Appendix B
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The intuition behind Proposition 1 is that implementation requires a certain
degree of congruence between social and private incentives. When society gains
more when the merger takes place in θ1 than in θ2, there should be at least one
firm that gains more with the merger in θ1 than in θ2. (For Firm 2 it would be more
appropriate to say that it loses less with the merger in θ1 than in θ2). When pri-
vate incentives move in the opposite direction as social incentives, implementation
becomes impossible.
We now present two examples and see how Condition N looks like.
Example 1. Uncertainty about fixed costs. f The effect on consumer surplus of
a merger is constant and we denote it by ∇CS. Assume that in economy θ1 the
merger increases welfare and in economy θ2 it reduces welfare. The change in
welfare due to monopolization can be written in each case as:
∆W (θ1) = P1(θ1) − P2(θ1) − ∇CS > 0 (3.1)
∆W (θ2) = P1(θ2) − P2(θ2) − ∇CS < 0 (3.2)
Subtracting (3.2) from (3.1) we have:
[
P1(θ1) − P1(θ2)
]
+
[
P2(θ2) − P2(θ1)
]
> 0
This implies that the necessary condition is satisfied. In this case, firms fully in-
ternalize the benefits of the merger i.e. the possible reduction in fixed costs. Then,
social incentives move in the same direction as private incentives and condition N
is satisfied.
Example 2. Uncertainty on capacities.
Market demand is given by P = 100−q, where P denotes price and q quantity.
The marginal costs of the firms are known. In duopoly, each firm has a marginal
cost 10. In monopoly the firm produces at marginal cost 5. In economy θ1, each
firm has a capacity k1 = 954 and in economy θ
2 each firm has a capacity k2 = 30.
The production capacity of the monopoly is 2ki. Then it is easy to verify that:
∆W (θ1) > 0 > ∆W (θ2)
But that
P1(θ1) < P1(θ2) and P2(θ2) < P2(θ1).
Society wants the merger to occur when capacities are low because then its anticom-
petitive effect is also low. On the contrary, firms prefer the merger when capacities
are high for exactly the same reason. Thus, condition N fails here.
We now look for a sufficient condition that allows the implementation of the
efficient merger policy in dominant strategies. Let D be the set of possible values
taken byP2 andE the set of possible values taken byP1. Consider now the following
condition.
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Condition S. There is a strictly increasing and onto function f : D −→ E such
that
∆W > 0 iff P1 > f(P2).
Condition S says that the DxE plane can be split by an increasing function such
that if a point is above (respectively below) this function, merger is socially optimal
(respectively not socially optimal). Notice that condition S implies condition N. The
only divergence between both conditions appears when the boundary of the merger
and the no-merger zones includes a flat step, a possibility that is not excluded by N.
Then, a strictly increasing function can not do the job of partitioning both regions.
In any case, notice that N requires that the function partitioning the merger and
the no-merger zones is not decreasing. Thus, if this function is never constant, as
happens in Example 1 above and Examples 3 to 5 below, conditions N and S are
identical because in this case condition N amounts to require the existence of a
strictly increasing function.
We now spell out several examples in which Condition S holds. We will assume
that D = E = R+.
Example 3. Uncertainty on synergy gains and demand.
Firms produce differentiated goods whose inverse demand functions are:
pi = a − Xi − bXj , i, j = 1, 2, i = j = 1, 2. (3.3)
where a > 0 and b ∈ [0, 1]. These demands are derived from the maximization
problem of a representative consumer (see Singh and Vives 1984) endowed with a
consumer surplus of the following form
a (X1 + X2) − X
2
1
2
− X
2
2
2
− bX1X2
Both firms produce premerger at unit cost c. The unit cost postmerger is d. Param-
eters a, c and d are unknown to the planner.
Condition S holds because with Cournot competition ∆W > 0 iff P1 >
P2( 3+2b3 ) and with Bertrand competition ∆W > 0 iff P1 > P2(
3−b
3(1−b) ) (see
Appendix C). With homogenous goods, Condition S holds for general demands
satisfying the standard stability condition (see Appendix D).
Example 4. Uncertainty on the degree of product differentiation.
We consider a market with two differentiated goods with demand functions as
in (3.3) and Cournot competition. In this case a is known and costs both premerger
(c) and postmerger (d) are also known. The unknown parameter refers to the degree
of product differentiation b. Condition S holds because ∆W > 0 iff P1 > f(P2)
where f(P2) = ( 23 )((a − c)
√
P2 − P22 ) (see Appendix C).
Example 5. Uncertainty on the degree of rationalization.
We consider a market with two differentiated goods with the same demands
as in (3.3). To keep expressions tractable we assume b = 12 . We have two firms
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competing with average cost c1 and c2 (c1 ≤ c2) respectively. The planner must
decide whether to approve the takeover of the inefficient firm by the efficient firm.
Parameters a, c1 and c2 are unknown to the planner. Condition S holds because with
Cournot competition ∆W > 0 iff P1 > P2( 5+2
√
3
6 ) and with Bertrand competition
because ∆W > 0 iff P1 > P2( 2(55+8
√
10)
81 ) (see Appendix E).
We now present our main result in this section.
Proposition 2. Under Condition S, the efficient merger policy can be implemented
in dominant strategies by the following mechanism: The buyer announces m1 ∈ E
and the seller announces m2 ∈ D. If m1 ≤ f(m2), the merger is not allowed.
If m1 > f(m2), the merger takes place and the buyer pays f(m2) and the seller
receives f−1(m1).
Proof. The mechanism yields the efficient merger policy if players tell the truth.
We show that the truth is a dominant strategy for the buyer. Denote by P o1 the true
value of P1. If P o1 > f(m2), the buyer is better-off with the merger and this is
obtained simply by telling the truth. If P o1 ≤ f(m2), the buyer is better-off without
the merger and this is obtained by telling the truth.
We show that the truth is a dominant strategy for the seller. Given that f(P2)
is strictly increasing we have that ∆W > 0 iff f−1(P1) > P2. Denote by P o2 the
true value of P2. If f−1(m1) > P o2 , the seller is better-off with the merger and this
is obtained simply by telling the truth. If f−1(m1) ≤ P o2 , the seller is better-off
without the merger and this is obtained by telling the truth. 
unionsq
Figure 2 illustrates the working of the implementing mechanism. Given the
messages sent by firms (m1,m2), the mechanism stipulates merger because m1 >
f(m2). Furthermore Firm 1 pays f(m2) and firm 2 receives f−1(m1). Figure 2
clearly reveals that the mechanism does not satisfy budget balance.
Our mechanism has some resemblance to the pivotal mechanism (Clarke 1971;
Groves 1973). In this mechanism (and in ours) an agent’s payment is independent of
her announcement unless it changes the level of the public good (the merger decision
in our case). In our case we need the function f to signal if those changes are welfare
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enhancing or not. This is not needed in the pivotal mechanism because social welfare
equals the sum of the utilities of the agents involved in the game. Notice that if a firm
tells the truth, it obtains payoffs larger or equal than those that can be obtained under
duopoly. In other words our mechanism is individually rational. Unfortunately, our
mechanism is not feasible because in general f(m2) = f−1(m1).
4 Nash implementation
The positive results obtained in the previous section depended on the fact that the
mechanism was not feasible. In this section we consider an equilibrium concept
weaker than dominant strategies, namely Nash equilibrium. We will see that if
Condition S does not hold, the efficient merger policy can not be implemented
with budget balance in Nash equilibrium. Moreover, under Condition S the effi-
cient merger policy can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with budget balance.
We therefore have a trade-off regarding the implementation of efficient mergers:
Implementation without budget balance is possible in dominant strategies (a very
robust equilibrium concept), and implementation with budget balance is possible
in Nash equilibrium (a not so appealing equilibrium concept).
Since the emphasis of this section is on budget balance, it is important to specify
the transfers associated with the efficient merger policy. We will assume that in the
case of no merger these transfers are zero and in the case of merger, they are any
transfers that make merger individually rational. If the merger occurs, the transfer
is the acquisition price.
We now invoke a result by Moore and Repullo (1990, p. 1094) on the imple-
mentation of (in our terminology) extended SCR with two agents:
Theorem1. If a twoagent extendedSCRΦ satisfiesmonotonicity and restricted veto
power and there is a bad outcome, then Φ can be implemented in Nash equilibrium
with budget balance.
Rather than giving formal definitions of these terms (which may be found in
the original paper) we will give literary (but we hope precise) descriptions of the
conditions of the above theorem.
Restricted Veto Power (RVP). Suppose outcome a is top ranked under θ by firm
j and there is an outcome b in the range of Φ such that under θ, the other firm i
weakly prefers a to b. Then a must be selected by Φ under θ.
Bad Outcome (BO). z is a bad outcome if for any θ, z is strictly worse for both
agents than any outcome in the range of Φ.
Monotonicity (M). Suppose outcome z is selected by Φ under characteristic θ.
Consider a new characteristic θ′ such that z goes up (or remains constant) in the
preferences of all firms. Then z should be selected by Φ under θ′.
Given an outcome z1 = (a1, t1, t2) we can define the set of allocations preferred
to z1 by firms 1 and 2 given θ respectively as:
U1(z1, θ) = {(a1, t1, t2)/t1 ≥t1} ∪ {(a2, t1, t2)/t1 ≥t1 +P1(θ)}
U2(z1, θ) = {(a1, t1, t2)/t2 ≥t2} ∪ {(a2, t1, t2)/t2 ≥t1 −P2(θ)}
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If given a state of the world θ′ we have that
Ui(z1, θ′) ⊆ Ui(z1, θ) i = 1, 2 (4.1)
we say that z1 goes up in the preferences of all firms or that the upper contour sets
shrink. (4.1) holds if:
P1(θ′) ≥ P1(θ) and P2(θ′) ≤ P2(θ)
Similarly given an outcome z2 = (a2, t1, t2) we have that
U1(z2, θ) = {(a2, t1, t2)/t1 ≥t1} ∪ {(a1, t1, t2)/t1 ≥t1 −P1(θ)}
U2(z2, θ) = {(a2, t1, t2)/t2 ≥t2} ∪ {(a1, t1, t2)/t2 ≥t1 +P2(θ)}
Then,
Ui(z2, θ′) ⊆ Ui(z2, θ) i = 1, 2
if
P1(θ′) ≤ P1(θ) and P2(θ′) ≥ P2(θ)
Clearly, RVP and BO hold in our framework: If the maximum amount of nega-
tive transfers is large enough, the top ranked outcome of, say, Firm 1 involves such
a large transfer that the other firm will prefer any outcome in Φ to this situation.
The bad outcome can be constructed by imposing very large negative transfers
to both firms. Also, by a theorem of Maskin (see e.g. Moore and Repullo 1990,
p. 1087), a Nash implementable SCR must be monotonic. Thus, the efficient merger
policy can be implemented in Nash equilibrium if and only if monotonicity holds.
Unfortunately, monotonicity does not always hold in our framework:
Proposition 3. Monotonicity does not hold in every possible domain.
Proof. Consider again Example 2. In the state of the world θ1 merger is the socially
optimal alternative. Consider now indifference curves in state θ2. It is the case that
P2(θ2) < P2(θ1) and P1(θ2) > P1(θ1). Thus when we go from θ1 to θ2 the point
selected by the efficient merger policy and the corresponding transfers go up in the
preferences of both firms. However, as we saw before, the merger is not socially
optimal at θ2. 
unionsq
Proposition 3 implies that the efficient merger policy can not be implemented in
Nash equilibrium in unrestricted environments. Nevertheless, if Condition S holds,
implementation becomes possible.
Proposition 4. If Condition S holds, then the efficient merger is implementable in
Nash equilibrium with budget balance.
Proof. We have demonstrated before that RVP and BO hold in our framework.
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Theorem 1. Then by Theorem 4.1. we only have to show that Monotonicity holds
to prove Nash implementation.
Given economy θ1 we may have that the merger either increases welfare
∆W (θ1) > 0 (4.2)
or that the merger reduces welfare:
∆W (θ1) ≤ 0 (4.3)
Suppose that (4.2) holds. That upper contour sets shrink is equivalent to:
P2(θ1) ≥ P2(θ2) and P1(θ1) ≤ P1(θ2). (4.4)
Condition S and (4.2) imply:
f(P2(θ1)) < P1(θ1).
Using (4.4), we have:
f(P2(θ2)) ≤ f(P2(θ1)) < P1(θ1) ≤ P1(θ2).
which implies, if Condition S is satisfied, that
∆W (θ2) > 0.
And this is what is implied by Monotonicity.
Suppose now that (4.3) holds. That upper contour sets shrink is equivalent to:
P2(θ1) ≤ P2(θ2) and P1(θ1) ≥ P1(θ2). (4.5)
Condition S and (4.3) imply
f(P2(θ1)) ≥ P1(θ1).
Using (4.5) we have:
f(P2(θ2)) ≥ f(P2(θ1)) ≥ P1(θ1) ≥ P1(θ2).
which implies if Condition S is satisfied, that
∆W (θ2) ≤ 0.
And this is what is implied by Monotonicity. 
unionsq
12
Table 1. Economy θ1
Firm 2
θ12 θ
2
2
Firm θ11 Π1(a1, θ1) − T, T Π1(a1, θ1) − S, S
1 θ21 Π1(a2, θ1), Π2(a2, θ1) − P Π1(a2, θ1), Π2(a1, θ1)
Table 2. Economy θ2
Firm 2
θ12 θ
2
2
Firm θ11 Π1(a1, θ2) − T, T Π1(a1, θ2) − S, S
1 θ21 Π1(a2, θ2), Π2(a2, θ2) − P Π1(a2, θ2), Π2(a2, θ2)
Finally we remark that the converse of Proposition 4 is not true, i.e. monotonicity
does not imply Condition S. Suppose that D = E = [1, 2] and that merging
is always the socially optimal alternative. The function required by Condition S
obviously does not exist, but the efficient merger policy is trivially implementable
in Nash equilibrium by a mechanism in which any message sent by the firms yields
the alternative ”merge”. Thus, this SCR must be monotonic, but it does not satisfy
Condition S.
We end this section by showing the implementing mechanism for a simple
case. There are only two possible economies, denoted by θ1 and θ2 such that
φo(θ1) = a1 and φo(θ2) = a2. Let θji denote the announcement of economy θj by
firm i. Condition S reads,
P1(θ1) = Π1(a1, θ1) − Π1(a2, θ1) > P1(θ2) = Π1(a1, θ2) − Π1(a2, θ2) (4.6)
or
P2(θ2) = Π2(a2, θ2) > P2(θ1) = Π2(a2, θ1). (4.7)
If (4.6) holds, the implementing mechanism is based on two numbers T and S that
satisfy
Π1(a1, θ1) − Π1(a2, θ1) > T > S > Π1(a1, θ2) − Π1(a2, θ2).
The implementing mechanism specifies merger whenever θ11 is announced and no
merger otherwise. When a merger takes place and θ12(resp. θ22) is announced Firm 1
pays T (S) and Firm 2 receives T (S). No other transfer is considered except when
the announcement is (θ21, θ12) that Firm 2 pays an exogenous fine P > 0. Observe
that in this case the budget is not balanced outside equilibrium, but we are only
requiring that budget balance holds in equilibrium. This will be satisfied if truth
telling is the only Nash equilibrium of the announcement game. To see this we write
down the payoff matrix of this game in economy θ1 and in economy θ2 (Tables 1
and 2).
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Table 3. Economy θ1
Firm 2
θ12 θ
2
2
Firm θ11 Π1(a1, θ1) − T, T Π1(a2, θ1) − P, Π2(a2, θ1)
1 θ21 Π1(a1, θ1) − S, S Π1(a2, θ1), Π2(a1, θ1)
Table 4. Economy θ2
Firm 2
θ12 θ
2
2
Firm θ11 Π1(a1, θ2) − T, T Π1(a2, θ2) − P, Π2(a2, θ2)
1 θ21 Π1(a1, θ2) − S, S Π1(a2, θ2), Π2(a1, θ2)
To see that, in each economy, telling the truth is the only Nash equilibrium
observe that for Firm 1 telling the truth is a strictly dominant strategy and given
that Firm 1 tells the truth the best response for Firm 2 is also to tell the truth.
If (4.7) holds, the implementing mechanism is based on two numbers T and S
that satisfy
Π2(a2, θ2) > S > T > Π2(a2, θ1)
The implementing mechanism specifies merger whenever θ12 is announced and no
merger otherwise. When a merger takes place and θ11(resp. θ21) is announced Firm 1
pays T (S) and Firm 2 receives T (S). No other transfer is considered except when
the announcement is (θ11, θ22) that Firm 1 pays an exogenous fine P > 0. Observe
that if firms tell the truth the mechanism implements in budget balance. To see that
truth telling is the only Nash equilibrium we write down the payoff matrix of the
announcement game played by firms in economy θ1 and in economy θ2 (Tables 3
and 4).
To see that, in each economy, telling the truth is the only Nash equilibrium
observe that for Firm 2 telling the truth is a strictly dominant strategy and given
that Firm 2 tells the truth the best response for Firm 1 is also to tell the truth.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we study the design of mechanisms that implement the efficient merger
policy in dominant strategies and in Nash equilibrium. The main departure of our
approach with the standard theory is that in our model, not all agents send messages.
We can call this, paternalistic implementation.
In our case Condition S is the key that allows us to implement the efficient merger
policy without budget balance in dominant strategies, and with budget balance in
Nash equilibrium. We have seen that this condition is satisfied in some standard
models used in Industrial Organization.
14
There are several extensions of our paper that are worth mentioning.
On the one hand, other solution concepts might be considered: i) We know that
any SCR is implementable in Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium in quasi-linear
environments (Moore and Repullo 1988). We do not know if a similar result would
hold in our framework. ii) It will be interesting to consider that firms have asym-
metric information, and to cast the merger problem in the framework of Bayesian
implementation with common values, see, e.g. Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). iii) The problem of coalition formation must be
addressed. We suspect that implementation of the efficient merger policy is not
possible under concepts like strong equilibrium.
On the other hand, we might consider more complex situations such as: i)
mergers that involve the transfer of shares or the acquisition of part of a firm, ii)
mergers with more than two firms and iii) situations where the regulator’s ability to
control side payments among firms is limited. All of these points are left for future
research.
Appendices
7.1 Appendix A
Assume we have only one consumer that knows the state of the economy θ. Subscript
0 identifies the variables that refer to consumers and subscripts 1 and 2 identify
the variables that refer to firms. We construct a mechanism that implements in
dominant strategies the efficient merger policy. The space of messages of every
player is: M1 = M2 = M0 = Θ. The outcome function is as follows:
h(m) = argmax
a∈A
CS(a,m0) + Π1(a,m1) + Π2(a,m2)
t0(m) = Π1(h(m),m1) + Π2(h(m),m2)
t1(m) = CS(h(m),m0) + Π2(h(m),m2)
t2(m) = CS(h(m),m0) + Π1(h(m),m1)
If agents tell the truth, this mechanism implements the efficient merger policy. It
is easy to see that truth is a dominant strategy for every player. For the consumer,
this comes from the fact that
CS(h(θ,m1,m2), θ) + Π1(h(θ,m1,m2),m1) + Π2(h(θ,m1,m2),m2) ≥
CS(h(m
′
0,m1,m2), θ)+Π1(h(m
′
0,m1,m2),m1)+Π2(h(m
′
0,m1,m2),m2)
for any m′0,m1,m2. A similar reasoning applies to firms 1 and 2.
7.2 Appendix B
Let θ1 and θ2 be such that φo(θ1) = a1 and φo(θ2) = a2. This implies that
∆W (θ1) > 0 ≥ ∆W (θ2).
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Suppose that φo can be implemented in dominant strategies. Then, by the Rev-
elation Principle, there exists a direct mechanism {{θ1i , θ2i }, h(), ti()}i=1,2 that
implements φo in Dominant Strategies, where θji denotes the announcement of
economy θj by firm i. Thus, if θ1 is true,
Π1(h(θ11, θ
2
2), θ
1) + t1(θ11, θ
2
2) ≥ Π1(h(θ21, θ22), θ1) + t1(θ21, θ22) (7.1)
Π2(h(θ11, θ
1
2), θ
1) + t2(θ11, θ
1
2) ≥ Π2(h(θ11, θ22), θ1) + t2(θ11, θ22) (7.2)
And if θ2 is true,
Π1(h(θ21, θ
2
2), θ
2) + t1(θ21, θ
2
2) ≥ Π1(h(θ11, θ22), θ2) + t1(θ11, θ22) (7.3)
Π2(h(θ11, θ
2
2), θ
2) + t2(θ11, θ
2
2) ≥ Π2(h(θ11, θ12), θ2) + t2(θ11, θ12) (7.4)
Adding Eqs. (7.1) and (7.3) we have:
Π1(h(θ11, θ
2
2), θ
1) + Π1(h(θ21, θ
2
2), θ
2) ≥ Π1(h(θ21, θ22), θ1) + Π1(h(θ11, θ22), θ2).
Adding Eqs. (7.2) and (7.4) we have:
Π2(h(θ11, θ
1
2), θ
1) + Π2(h(θ11, θ
2
2), θ
2) ≥ Π2(h(θ11, θ22), θ1) + Π2(h(θ11, θ12), θ2).
Since the mechanism implements φo we have that h(θi1, θi2) = ai i = 1, 2 and
Π2(a1, θ1) = 0. Thus, the previous two equations can be rewritten as follows:
Π1(h(θ11, θ
2
2), θ
1) + Π1(a2, θ2) ≥ Π1(a2, θ1) + Π1(h(θ11, θ22), θ2)
Π2(h(θ11, θ
2
2), θ
2) ≥ Π2(h(θ11, θ22), θ1).
If h(θ11, θ22) = a1, the first equation can be written as:
Π1(a1, θ1) − Π1(a2, θ1) ≥ Π1(a1, θ2) − Π1(a2, θ2) (7.5)
If h(θ11, θ22) = a2, the second equation can be written as:
Π2(a2, θ2) ≥ Π2(a2, θ1). (7.6)
Therefore, a necessary condition for implementation is that one of the last two
equations holds and they can be written as in Proposition 1 given the definitions
introduced in Sect. 3.
7.3 Appendix C
Profits in monopoly amount to π1 = (a−d)
2
2(1+b) . Given that the monopoly sells x =
a−d
2(1+b) , Social Welfare amounts to W1 = U(x, x) − 2dx = 3 (a−d)
2
(1+b) =
3
2π1.
Profits in duopoly and Cournot competition amount to π2c = (a−c2+b )
2 and Social
Welfare to W2c = (a−c2+b )
2(3 + b) = (3 + b)π2c.
Profits in duopoly and Bertrand competition amount to π2b = ( 1−b1+b )(
a−c
2−b )
2
and Social Welfare to W2b = ( 3−2b1+b )(
a−c
2−b )
2 = ( 3−2b1−b )π2b.
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Cournot competition: ∆W > 0 iff ( 32 )(P1 + P2) > P2(3 + b). Rearranging
the last expression we have P1 > P2( 3+2b3 ). Thus, in this case f(P2) = P2(
3+2b
3 )
Bertrand competition: ∆W > 0 iff ( 32 )(P1+P2) > P2(
3−2b
1−b ). Rearranging the
last expression we have P1 > P2( 3−b3(1−b) ). Thus, in this case f(P2) = P2(
3−b
3(1−b) ).
When a, c and d are known and the unknown parameter is b, we have for the
Cournot case that ∆W = ( 32 )(P1 + P2) − P2(3 + b). Then, using the equation of
duopoly profits we may write b as a function of P2.
∆W =
(
3
2
)
(P1 + P2) − P2
(
1 +
a − c√
P2
)
∆W > 0 iff P1 >
(
2
3
)(
(a − c)
√
P2 − P22
)
Thus in this case f(P2) = ( 23 )((a − c)
√
P2 − P22 ) and f ′(P2) > 0.
7.4 Appendix D
Assume that firms compete a la Cournot, and market demand, given by P (X),
satisfies P ′(X) < 0 and
P ′(X) + P”(X)X < 0. (7.7)
Condition (7.7) guarantees existence and uniqueness of Cournot equilibrium with
constant marginal costs. Define β(X) ≡ P”(X)XP ′(X) as the degree of concavity. Then
(7.7) can be rewritten as β(X) > −1. We state the following results concerning a
symmetric oligopoly with n firms and constant marginal cost denoted generically
by e, where e may be either c or d. Denote respectively by Xn(e), πn(e) and Wn(e)
the output, profits and social welfare in the Cournot equilibrium. Xn(e) satisfies
the equilibrium condition:
P − e + P ′ Xn(e)
n
= 0 (7.8)
Differentiating (7.8) with respect to e we have:
P ′(
dXn(e)
de
) − 1 + P”(dXn(e)
de
)
Xn(e)
n
+ P ′
dXn(e)
de
n
= 0. Thus,
dXn(e)
de
=
n
(n + β + 1)P ′
(7.9)
Profits in equilibrium satisfy:
πn(e) = −P ′
(
Xn(e)
n
)2
. Thus,
dπn(e)
de
= −P
′Xn(e)
dXn(e)
de (β + 2)
n2
= − (β + 2)Xn(e)
n(n + β + 1)
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Social Welfare is Wn(e) =
∫Xn(e)
0 (P (x) − e)dx. Thus,
dWn(e)
de
= (P − e)dXn(e)
de
− Xn(e)
Using (7.8) and (7.9), we have that
dWn(e)
de
= −Xn(e)
(
P ′ dXn(e)de
n
+ 1
)
= − (n + β + 2)Xn(e)
(n + β + 1)
Merger increases social welfare if ∆W = W1(d) − W2(c) > 0. Given that πi(e)
is invertible we have that W1(π−11 (π1)) > W2(π
−1
2 (π2)). As π1 = P1 + P2
and π2 = P2, W1(π−11 (P1 +P2)) > W2(π
−1
2 (P2)). As W1() and π1() are strictly
decreasing we have thatP1 > π1(W−11 (W2(π
−1
2 (P2))))−P2.So, we take f(P2) =
π1(W−11 (W2(π
−1
2 (P2)))) − P2.7
Finally, we check that f is strictly increasing.
f ′(P2) =

 dπ1(W −11 (W2(π−12 (P2))))de
dW1(W −11 (W2(π−12 (P2))))
de



 dW2(π−12 (P2))de
dπ2(π−12 (P2))
de

− 1
= 2
(
1 +
−1
(β
(
X1
(
W−11
(
W2(π−12 (P2))
)))
+ 3)
)
×
(
1 +
2
(β
(
X2(π−12 (P2))
)
+ 2)
)
− 1 > 0.
7.5 Appendix E
7.5.1 Cournot competition
To simplify expressions we use a ≡ A− c1 and d ≡ c2 − c1. The following system
gives us a and d as a function of P1 and P2.
(
a(2 − b) − 2d
4 − b2
)2
= P2
a2
2(1 + b)
−
(
a(2 − b) + bd
4 − b2
)2
= P1
The only solution when b= 12 satisfying a > 0 and d <
3a
4 is given by:
a =
√
3(P2 + 4P1) − 32
√
P2 and d =
3
4
√
3(P2 + 4P1) − 3
√
P2. (7.10)
7 We can also consider that the buyer is a Stackelberg leader. In the case of linear demand,Assumption
1 holds by taking f(Pa) = 3Pa.
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Using equilibrium outputs the change in welfare can be written as a function of a
and d:
∆W =
252ad − 27a2 − 188d2
450
. (7.11)
Using (7.10), (7.11) can be rewritten as a function of P1 and P2:
∆W =
6P1 − 4P2 −
√
3P2(P2 + 4P1)
4
This function has two roots P1 = P2( 5±2
√
3
6 ). As ∆W is convex in P1, we have
that ∆W > 0 if P1 < P2( 5−2
√
3
6 )and P1 > P2(
5+2
√
3
6 ). However only the second
restriction is compatible with P1 > P2.
7.5.2 Bertrand competition
The following system gives us a and d as a function of P1 and P2.(
a(2 − b − b2) − (2 − b2)d
(4 − b2)(4 − 5b2 + b4)
)2
= P2
a2
2(1 + b)
−
(
a(2 − b − b2) + bd
(4 − b2)(4 − 5b2 + b4)
)2
= P1
The only solution when b= 12 satisfying a > 0 and d <
5a
7 is given by:
a =
7
√
39P1 + 4P2 − 36
√
P2
13
(7.12)
d =
10
√
39P1 + 4P2 − 45
√
3P2
26
(7.13)
Using equilibrium outputs the change in welfare can be written as a function of a
and d:
∆W =
800ad − 125a2 − 632d2
1350
(7.14)
Using (7.12) and (7.13), (7.14) can be rewritten as a function of P1 and P2:
∆W =
351P1 − 434P2 − 48
√
P2(4P2 + 13P1)
338
This function has two roots P1 = P2( 2(55±8
√
10)
81 ). As the function is convex in
P1, we have that ∆W > 0 if P1 < P2( 2(55−8
√
10)
81 ) and P1 > P2(
2(55+8
√
10)
81 ).
However only the second restriction is compatible with P1 > P2.
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